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Abstract— We consider the classic motion planning problem
defined over a roadmap in which a vehicle seeks to find an
optimal path to a given destination from a given starting
location in presence of an attacker who can launch attacks
on the vehicle over any edge of the roadmap. The vehicle
(defender) has the capability to switch on/off a countermeasure
that can detect and permanently disable the attack if it occurs
concurrently. We model this problem using the framework of
a zero-sum dynamic game with a stopping state being played
simultaneously by the two players. We characterize the Nash
equilibria of this game and provide closed form expressions
for the case of two actions per player. We further provide an
analytic lower bound on the value of the game and characterize
conditions under which it grows sub-linearly with the number
of stages. We then study the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium
to (i) the cost of using the countermeasure, (ii) the cost of motion
and (iii) the benefit of disabling the attack. We then apply these
results to solve the motion planning problem and compare the
benefit of our approach over a competing approach based on
converting the problem to a shortest path problem using the
expected cost of playing the game over each edge.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of connected autonomous vehicles (CAV) and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) have paved its path into
various applications including mobility services, vehicle pla-
tooning, delivery systems, search and rescue operations and
surveillance. However, the use of such vehicles faces a num-
ber of challenges including cyber and physical attacks [1],
[2], [3]. Continuous scanning for attacks also requires energy
which can greatly hamper the successful completion of the
mission. Therefore, it becomes imperative to factor in the
risk in presence of an adversary at the route planning stage,
which motivates research in the domain of secure route
planning. This work will have a significant impact in assuring
integrity of various real-world systems such as Amazon
Prime Air or Google’s Project Wing. This paper studies
the interplay between costs related to mobility and security
in a prototypical path planning problem in presence of an
adversary via a dynamic game with stopping states.
A. Related literature
Security of cyber-physical systems (CPS) including mobile
robots has attracted a lot of attention recently. Recent works
include [4], [5] that characterizes robustness of state estima-
tors under attack in presence of process noise and modeling
errors. Reference [6] addresses the use of game theoretic
methods to compute locally optimal solutions in presence
of attacks and known bounds on disturbances applied to
GPS-spoofing of a linear dynamical system. Reference [7]
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determine a secure trajectory for a robot (autonomous vehi-
cle) when moving a source to a destination and characterize
conditions under which attack remains undetected.
The importance of communication data in order to avoid
damages or manipulate systems is discussed in [8]. The
authors develop a metric to secure CPS communication and
mitigate potential attacks. Considering increased distributed
mechanisms, secure transmission of data poses another set
of challenges for designing such security protocols. Owing
to the increase in swarm-robotics applications, reference
[9] proposes a distributed robust sub-modular optimization
algorithm that will safeguard robots against denial-of-service
failures/attacks. Related to swarm-robotics, reference [10]
addresses security measures for motion planning to safe-
guard a mobile robot against eavesdropping. The proposed
solution is a secure communication in order to encode these
packets containing trajectory information to save it from
any eavesdropper. Reference [11] addresses the problem
of designing a sensor network to optimally guard security
critical infrastructure, such as a helicopter deployed in a flood
hit region to search and relocate the survivors and efficiently
obtain near-optimal distributions.
Game theory can be used to model cyber-security as-
pects of vehicular networks such as communication links,
hardware and the software of such systems [12]. Attacks
over the wireless communication channels have been studied
in [1]. Cyber-security threats are modeled and analyzed to
generate the threat profile of the system in order to secure
the vulnerabilities. Reference [3] models cyber-security in
conjunction with the communication links, hardware and
software to develop a risk model of a threat profile. A Man-
in-the-Middle attack was demonstrated in reference [2]. It
was shown that professional UAV(s) used for mission critical
tasks are susceptible to such attacks and can be secured
through an appropriate set of countermeasures.
In the context of secure route planning, the only recent
works to the best of our knowledge are the ones considered
in [13], [14], which adopt a game theoretic model to select a
route for a UAV in presence of a malicious attacker that can
attack on vertices of the domain. Our work differs from these
references in multiple aspects including: dynamic modeling
of the attack process over an edge as opposed to attacks
being static and on vertices; and no specific requirements on
the edges over multiple paths to be non-overlapping.
B. Contribution
The contributions of this work are three-fold. First, we
introduce a framework for multistage zero-sum games with a
novel structure of a stopping state, i.e., the game terminates
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if the players play out of a given subset of their actions
(cf. Figure 1). This game serves as a model to characterize
the costs of mobility and security while moving over an edge
of a given roadmap. The proposed model can be considered
as a dual version of the classic Chicken game or the War of
attrition [15] with an additive stage cost which models look-
ahead. We characterize the Nash equilibria of this game and
completely analyze the case of two actions per player.
Second, we construct a meta-game over the roadmap,
where the objective of the defender (UAV or CAV) is to go
from a source node to a destination node while minimizing
the impact of attack. The attacker’s objective is to target the
most vulnerable edge over the given set of paths over which
the defender plans its path(s). For ease of exposition, we
assume that the attacker is restricted to attack only one edge
along the path of the defender. Over a simple network, we
quantify the sensitivity of the choice of path (resp. edges for
the attacker) to the costs of mobility and security.
Third, for larger roadmaps, the solution of the meta-game
is compared against a simple heuristic based on computing
the shortest path constrained to a single attack over an edge
for a range of graph/network sizes. The shortest path is
calculated by replacing the edge weights with the value
of playing the multi-stage zero-sum game along the edge.
We compare the length of the path obtained by solving the
meta-game and the length of shortest path under an edge
attack. We observe that in sparse graphs, the meta game
approach yields the same solution as the heuristic with a
high likelihood, whereas it yields a reduced path length in
dense graphs, but with a larger computation time.
C. Outline of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. We formulate the
problem of the multi-stage feedback game and the meta-
game in Section II. In Section III, the solution to the multi-
stage feedback game is characterized as a function of the
stage costs and number of stages. The sensitivity of the
outcome of the game are drawn corresponding to the stage
cost parameters. The meta-game is evaluated in Section IV
on a simple network and the sensitivity of choosing the
shortest path versus the alternatives is evaluated as a function
of the the stage cost parameters and number of stages
along an edge. In Section V, the game is simulated over
large graphs/networks and compared against the shortest path
heuristic. Finally, we conclude this paper and identify future
directions in Section VI. The proofs of all mathematical
claims are presented in the appendix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider an environment modeled as a graph G with a
set of vertices V and a set of edges E. Given an edge e, we
model the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a
multi-stage zero-sum game (MZSG) defined by a sequence of
matrices S1, S2, . . . , SKe , where Ke is the number of stages
for the edge e. For ease of exposition, we restrict the descrip-
tion to the case where each matrix Sk ∈ R2×2. At each stage
k over the edge e, when the defender (row player) and the
attacker (column player) simultaneously select actions from
Fig. 1: The multi-stage zero-sum game with stopping states along
one of the edges of the graph. The dotted line at each stage
indicate the choice of the defender. The policy of the attacker
(resp. defender) is abbreviated as {A,NA} (resp. {D,DA}) for
{Attack, No attack} (resp. {Defend, No defend}). The termination
of the game is indicated by the red colored node.
the set {Defend, No Defend} and {Attack, No Attack}, re-
spectively, then the payoff to the attacker equals Skij . We
consider that the attack is detected at stage k over edge e,
whenever the action pair {Defend, Attack} gets selected. The
game stops at stage k of edge e if the attacker gets detected
a total of L times until stage k. An illustration of a simple
graph with MZSG in shown in the Figure 1. This stopping
state models the fact that after getting detected a total of L
times, the attack is permanently disabled. Thus, if the players
select actions {(i1, j1), . . . , (iKe , jKe)}, then the net payoff
to the attacker is given by
Ke∑
k=1
Skik,jkI(the game stopped at or before stage k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ak
),
where I(Ak) ∈ {0, 1} denotes the indicator function of the
event Ak and is described as,
I(Ak) =
{
0 if {A,D} ∈ ∩kn=1{ik, jk},
1 otherwise
For the edge e, a multi-stage behavioral policy for the
defender is a set of probability distributions Ye :=
{y1, . . . , yKe} ∈ ∆Ke2 and for the attacker is a set of
probability distributions Ze := {z1, . . . , zKe} ∈ ∆Ke2 . Here,
∆2 is the probability simplex in 2 dimensions. Let Je :
(∆Ke2 ×∆Ke2 )→ R denote the expected payoff to the attacker
over edge e. Then, Je is given by
Je(Ye,Ze) =
Ke∑
k=1
y′kS
kzkI
(
Game stopped at
or before stage k
)
. (1)
If the attacker attacks the edge e, then the cost of the edge
e is defined by behavioral policies (Y∗e ,Z∗e ) that are in Nash
equilibrium over the edge e, i.e., they satisfy
Je(Y∗e ,Ze) ≤ Je(Y∗e ,Z∗e ) ≤ Je(Ye,Z∗e ), ∀Y,Z ∈ ∆Ke2 .
We denote the Nash equilibrium value, J∗e := Je(Y∗e ,Z∗e ).
Since the cost of traversing an edge depends on whether the
edge has been attacked or not, we can define the cost we of
the edge e as follows,
we =
{
J∗e , if edge e is attacked,∑Ke
k=1 S
k
2,2, otherwise
, (2)
where the summation refers to only the cost of motion over
the edge. Two edges e and e′ are said to be linked if both
e and e′ share a common vertex. Let S, T ∈ V denote a
start/destination pair of vertices. A path from S to T is a
collection of linked edges piST := {eSi1 , ei1i2 , . . . , einT }.
The collection of paths from S to T is denoted as PST . The
cost of a path piST ∈ PST is defined as
wpiST =
∑
e∈piST
we. (3)
This cost we can then be used to define a meta-game being
played between the defender and the attacker in which the
attacker selects a subset E ⊂ E of |E| edges to attack and the
defender selects a path piST ∈ PST . For the possible n paths
the subset of attack edges is defined as, E = ∩|PST |i=1 piiST ∈
PST . This meta-game is represented equivalently through the
entries of a matrix W having a number of rows equal to the
cardinality |PST | and the number of columns equal to
(|E|
|E|
)
.
A mixed policy for the defender (resp. attacker) in the meta-
game is a probability distribution y˜ (resp. z˜) over the set of
paths PST (resp. the subsets of edges with cardinality |E|).
The goal of this paper is to compute a Nash equilibrium
value for the meta-game defined as,
WNE = min
y˜∈∆|PST |
max
z˜∈∆
(|E||E|)
y˜TWz˜, (4)
and the resulting optimal policies for each player, i.e.,
y˜∗ ∈ arg min
y˜∈∆|PST |
y˜′Wz˜∗, z˜∗ ∈ arg max
z˜∈∆
(|E||E|)
y˜∗′Wz˜.
Outline of the approach: In the sequel, we first present
the solution to the multi-stage zero-sum game with stopping
states played over an edge through an analytic expression
for Je as a function of the number of stages Ke for the
case of identical payoff matrices at every stage, i.e., S1 =
S2 = · · · = SKe = S and L = 1, i.e., the game terminates
after the attack is detected once. We then use this solution
to define the cost matrix W and compute the solution of
the meta-game for small sized graphs, i.e., small values
of |PST |. Finally, we provide a comparison with efficient
heuristics based on shortest path algorithms and quantify
their effectiveness against the attack model considered.
III. DYNAMIC GAME WITH STOPPING STATES
ON AN EDGE
In this section, we analyze the zero-sum game played
along an edge e in the case of L = 1, i.e., the attack is
disabled when the defender defends concurrently when the
attacker attacks.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the game stops either in the
red states or at any of the white leaf nodes. Since this is a
complete information feedback game, a standard technique
to solve these games using the cost to go function (e.g., see
[15]) to be solved recursively using the equation,
Vk−1 = Val(VkD + S), (5)
where k ∈ {Ke,Ke − 1, . . . , 1}, is the stage, Vk is the
expected value of the game at the kth stage, S is the stage
cost matrix, D is the decision matrix at every stage as a
consequence of the termination at the game corresponding
to the action pair {Defend, Attack} and Val(·) is a function
mapping which takes in expected value of the next stage k
and stage cost and returns the expected cost stage k−1. For
the 2×2 case considered in this paper, equation (5) is further
expanded as,
Vk−1 = Val
Vk
[
0 1
1 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
+
[
s11 s12
s21 s22
]
= min
yk∈∆2
max
zk∈∆2
y′k
(
Vk
[
0 1
1 1
]
+
[
s11 s12
s21 s22
])
zk.
(6)
The expected value of the game for given stage is given as,
Vk−1 = y∗k
′
(
Vk
[
0 1
1 1
]
+
[
s11 s12
s21 s22
])
z∗k, (7)
where {y∗k, z∗k} is a mixed Nash equilibrium at stage k.
Our first result summarizes analytic expressions for the
Nash equilibrium policies and the value below.
Theorem 3.1: Consider the dynamic game with stopping
states modeled using equation (7), ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Ke}. The
unique Nash equilibrium of the game at stage k is given by,
y∗k =

s22 − s21
s11 − s12 − s21 + s22 − Vk
s11 − s12 − Vk
s11 − s12 − s21 + s22 − Vk
 , and (8)
z∗k =

s22 − s12
s11 − s12 − s21 + s22 − Vk
s11 − s21 − Vk
s11 − s12 − s21 + s22 − Vk
 , (9)
where VKe := Val(S) = det(S)/(s11 − s12 − s21 + s22),
and
Vk−1 = Vk +
det(S)− s22Vk
s11 − s12 − s21 + s22 − Vk , (10)
and det(S) is the determinant of S. 
The proof of this result has been included in the appendix.
While Theorem 3.1 yields an implicit formula to compute the
solution of the game recursively. Next, we parameterize the
stage cost matrix S with ratios r1 and r2 as follows,
S = s11
[
1 1
r1 r2
]
, (11)
where r1 :=
s12
s11
, and r2 :=
s22
s11
.
The motivation for such a matrix relies on the assumption
that the payoff for defending remains independent of the
actions of the attacker. The result of a parameterized matrix
(11) causes the recursive equation (10) to take the form,
Vk−1 = s11
(
Vk +
r2 − r1 − r2Vk
r2 − r1 − Vk
)
. (12)
We determine two solutions to the defined recursion equation
namely; r2 > 0 and when the ratio r2 = 0, while normalizing
the payoff corresponding to defense to unity, i.e., s11 = 1.
Proposition 3.2: In the limit of large number of stages K
(or equivalently, the inter-stage time interval tending to zero),
if r2 = 0;
Vk = −r1 +
√
r21 + (2r1Ke + 2r1(1− k) + 1),
otherwise, Vk satisfies
(r2 − 1)c log(|r2Vk − c|/r1)
r22
− (Vk − 1)
r2
= (Ke − k).
(13)
where c := r2 − r1. 
The proof of this result is presented in the appendix. Given
the number of stages along an edge Ke, the outcome of a
game is determined at k = 0, i.e., V0 which is the solution of
the game (equation (1)). From equation (13) we can deduce
that the outcome of the game increases sublinearly with total
number of stages Ke for sufficiently small values of r2.
The effect of the ratio r2 on the outcome of the MZSG,
policy of the defender and attacker as a function of the total
stages are shown in Figures 2a, 2b and 2c. It is observed
that with increasing ratio r2 the sublinearity property on the
outcome of multi-stage zero-sum game with stopping states
is dominated by a linear term which is a function of r2. The
policy of the defender y0 at the start of a game is shown
in the Figure 2b and it is observed that the probability of
defending reduces with the increasing number of stages Ke.
Similarly, from Figure 2b, the attack policy z0 is shown to
decrease over the number of stages Ke. The results of the
policies for both the defender and attacker is a consequence
of the additive stage cost, where it is the most beneficial for
the attacker and defender to play actively (Attack, Defend)
toward the end of the game.
With the game well defined in the final stage Ke, using
equation (13), we can further determine the limiting values
of the attacker and defender policy. The Nash equilibrium at
the final stage Ke is given by,
y∗Ke =

r2 − r1
r2 − r1 − 1
1
1− (r2 − r1)
 , z∗Ke =

r2 − 1
r2 − r1 − 1
r1
1− (r2 − r1)
 . (14)
The following result summarizes a key property of this
analysis.
Corollary 3.3: For the zero-sum multi-stage feedback
game defined by equation (5), with a constant stage cost S,
the mixed policies for the defender and attacker at the start
of the MZSG as the number of stages Ke →∞ is given as,
lim
Ke→∞
y∗1 =
[
0
1
]
, lim
Ke→∞
z∗1 =
[
0
1
]
.
In short, this means that both players begin with not
defending and not attacking, respectively at the beginning
of the game and gradually (monotonically) shift the weight
toward defending and attacking as the stages progress!
Numerical results
We now present numerical results of the game analyzed
in the previous subsection. The simulation of the game is
performed with the matrices S1, S2, ..., SK = S given by
S =
[
30 30
70 10
]
.
The simulation with attack L = 1 is shown in the Figure
2d. The outcome of the game as a function of the stages
is shown to increase linearly with the number of stages Ke
(cf. Proposition 3.2). An alternate variant of the stage matrix
discounted along the stages, i.e., Sk = βkS is compared
against the original fixed stage cost. It is observed the
discounted matrix rises to a peak and then tapers down.
This will also be reflected in the policy of the attacker and
the defender which saturate to a steady value in the early
stages of the game followed by a decrease. The motivation
to compare such a discounted stage costs is provide a sense
of weighing for the future stages. In the next section, the
results of this MZSG will be used to create a meta-game
over the possible paths and edges.
IV. SOLUTION TO THE META-GAME
Consider the graph G with vertices V and edges E as
defined in Section II. The cost V0 over an edge e with the
number of stages, Ke is determined using MZSG presented
in Section III. The determined cost is then assigned as an
edge weight for the corresponding edge e of the graph G.
Suppose that there exist m possible paths from a start node
S to an end node T and up to n edges over the m paths, the
meta game matrix is defined as,
W =

Wpi1e1 Wpi1e2 . . . Wpi1en
Wpi2e1 Wpi2e2 . . . Wpi2en
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Wpime1 Wpime2 . . . Wpimen
 ,
where pii, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} are possible paths and ej , j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n} are possible edges, Wpiiej represents the sum of
edge costs on the path pii given that the attack is over edge ej ,
which is obtained from equations (2) and (3). The zero-sum
meta game defined by W from equation (4) is solved using
a standard linear programming technique [15]. The solution
of the zero-sum meta game WNE is compared against the
length of shortest path LSEA taking into account that only
one of the edge e in the graph G can be attacked. LSEA
is computed using the Algorithm 1. Here, piSP denotes the
shortest path.
An illustration of a simple graph is presented in Fig-
ure 3a. The graph consists of 2 paths namely; PST =
{{eST }, {eS1, e1T }} i.e., from node S to T , and from node
S → 1 followed by 1 → T . The edges consist of E =
{eST , eS1, e1T }. Under the assumption of a fixed stage cost,
S =
[
30 30
70 10
]
,
over the entire graph G, the MZSG and the meta-game (W )
is solved. The results of the simple graph/network are illus-
trated in Figure 3b, where the edge weights are determined
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Fig. 2: (a) Outcome of the MZSG game as a function of ratio r2 and the stages over an edge Ke, with number of attacks limited to
L = 1. (b) Policy of the defender at the start (k = 0) of the MZSG for a given number of stages Ke. (c) Policy of the attacker (k = 0)
at the start MZSG for a given number of stage Ke. (d) Outcome of the MZSG as a function of Ke i.e., number of stages with r2 = 1030
given (i) fixed stage cost Sk = S (ii) variable stage cost Sk = βkS. Here, β = 0.9.
Algorithm 1: Shortest path edge attack
Input: G(graph)
Output: LSEA := Length of the shortest path under
with an edge attack
for every e ∈ E do
Set we = V0 for edge e ;
end
piSP = Dijkstra (V, {we1 , . . . , we|E|})
Compute the row of W corresponding to WpiSP ,e.
LSEA = arg maxe∈piSP WpiSP ,e
using equation (2) which involves solving MZSG. The figure
also indicates the shortest path which uses non-negative
edge weights to find a path (such as a Dijkstra algorithm).
The defender and attacker probabilities shown in Figures 3c
and 3d, respectively. From the plots, we observe that the
likelihood of choosing the shortest path and an edge on the
corresponding path is higher as compared to the alternative
one in view of both the defender and attacker. The results
are a function of the number of stages and stage costs on
each edge.
A. Sensitivity of optimal policies to the game costs
Here we observe the sensitivity of picking the paths and
edges for the simple graph G (Figure 3a) as a function
of stage cost and edge weights. In the first scenario, we
examine the sensitivity over the stage cost. The stage cost
is parameterized with 2 ratios exactly as given by equation
(11),
S = s11
[
1 1
r1 r2
]
,
where s11 is a constant which corresponds to the defense
cost, r1 is the factor by which the defender pays over the
constant when attacked and not defended, and r2 is the
proportion by which the defender needs to pay when it goes
from one stage to another under no attack. The conditions
under which completely mixed Nash equilibria exist is given
by r1 ≥ 1 and r2 < 1. The sensitivity plot of choosing the
shortest path (Pdef) and edge along the shortest path (Patt)
as a function of stage costs ratios r1 and r2 are shown in
Figures 4a and 4b, respectively.
We observe that the probability of choosing the shortest
path and the edge on the same is dependent on both r1 and
r2, The probability of picking the shortest path decreases
with increasing r1, indicative of the fact that the payoff
while not defending under an attack is high and therefore, the
defender averts risk of the shortest path. For increasing r2,
we observe that the probability of choosing the shortest path
increases. This relates to the fact that the cost of mobility is
high, i.e., under no defense and no attack the payoff is high,
and therefore, the defender prefers taking the shortest path.
Next, we characterize the sensitivity of the policies as a
function of the number of stages Ke along the shortest path
and the alternate path which consists of 2 edges. We increase
the number of stages in both edges equally. From Figure 4c,
it can be inferred that the probability of choosing the shortest
path Pdef (resp. alternate path) monotonically increases
(resp. decreases) with the number of stages. Similarly, from
Figure 4d, the probability of choosing the shortest path edge
is directly proportional to the number of stages over the edge
eST and is inversely proportional to the number of stages
along the path eS1∪ e1T . Thus, if the number of stages over
a path is significantly higher than over other paths, then the
defender probability of selecting such a path is higher.
Thus, we conclude from the sensitivity plots that the ratios
r1 and r2 dictate the defender to be either risk seeking or risk
averse, i.e., when the cost of mobility is high, the defender
is more likely to choose the shortest path, whereas when
the payoff under an attack is high, the defender prefers an
alternate safer path. Furthermore, the influence of number
of stages Ke strongly governs the policy of the defender
and attacker. Alternate path(s) with large number of stages
strongly deviate the policy away from the shortest path. In
the next section, we will see how well the solution of the
game performs against Algorithm 1 over larger sized graphs
and determine if the solution of the shortest path can serve
as a reasonable secure route for large networks/graphs.
V. COMPARISONS ON LARGER NETWORKS
In this section, we solve the meta game in equation (4)
being played over a network with a large number of vertices
and then compare the result with Algorithm 1. An example
of a larger sized game is illustrated in Figures 5a and 5b.
The number of vertices in the graph are equal to 10 and
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Fig. 3: (a) Illustration of a simple graph with 3 vertices and 3 edges. The start and end vertex is indicated with S and T respectively.
The number of stages between the nodes i and j are given by ki,j . (b) The simple network (figure 3a) with stages over the edge,
kS1 = k1T = 3 and kST = 6. The shortest path is calculated over the edge weights. (c) The solution of the meta game with the defender
probabilities over the paths. The shortest path is indicated with larger arrow compared to others and different node colors. (d) The solution
of the meta game with the attacker probabilities over the edges.
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Fig. 4: (a) The sensitivity of choosing the shortest path (Pdef) with changing r1 and r2 with fixed stages over each edge. (b) The sensitivity
of choosing the shortest path edge (Patt) with changing r1 and r2 with fixed stages over each edge (c) The sensitivity of choosing the
shortest path (Pdef) with changing number of stages over the edges KpiS1,1T and KpiST given a fixed stage cost. (d) The sensitivity of
choosing the shortest path edge (Patt) with changing number of stages over the edges KpiS1,1T and KpiST given a fixed stage cost
.
they are sparsely connected. The path(s) of interest is(are)
from vertex 1 to 10 i.e., the source is at 1 with the destination
is at 10. From Figure 5a, we observe that the likelihood of
taking an alternate path is higher as opposed to the shortest
path evaluated using Algorithm 1. Similarly, from Figure 5b,
we observe that the attacker distributes its attack likelihood
over the shortest path and other possible paths. Further, over
a path, it is better to attack an edge that is closer to the
destination.
In general, for densely connected directed acyclic graphs
(DAG) with N vertices, the possible paths scale as 2N−2
with total number of edges being N(N+1)2 − N . Therefore,
the size of the meta game increases exponentially with the
number of vertices and therefore, W ∈ R2N−2×(N(N+1)2 −N).
Now we will investigate the solutions of the meta game
from equation (4) in comparison with Algorithm 1 for a
given number of vertices. The large network is generated
by uniformly sampling the vertices from a unit square. The
number of stages Ke over an edge is proportional to the
Euclidean length of the edge. The stage cost for the network
is kept constant and equal to the one defined in the simple
network in Section IV. The average degree of each vertex in
the graph is set between the limits [2, 3]. The computation
times and the solutions of both the meta game and the
shortest path from Algorithm 1 are compared against each
other in Tables I and II.
From Table I, we observe that the average time taken to
solve the meta game decreases with an increasing number of
nodes, however, with a decrease in benefit when compared
to the solution of Algorithm 1. The decrease in computation
time is a consequence of the average degree per vertex being
consistent across graphs of various sizes, thus, increasing the
sparsity of graphs with large number of vertices. In contrast,
from Table II, we observe that the performance of the meta
game increases with the graph size, but at the expense of
increasing the computation time needed to solve the meta
game. Probabilities of picking the shortest path is shown in
Figures 5c and 5d. From both figures, we observe that the
probabilities of picking the shortest path corresponding to
Algorithm 1 increases with the sparsity of a graph as opposed
to a densely connected graph. This implies that the defender
becomes risk seeking over sparse graphs and risk averse over
a densely connected graphs.
TABLE I: Performance table of the meta game and the shortest
edge attack averaged over 100 runs Average degree of each node
in a graph is 2.
Nodes Time performance,Time(WNE)/Time(LSEA)
Cost performance,
WNE/LSEA
4 157.500 0.86
6 165.000 0.89
8 135.571 0.90
10 112.143 0.93
12 101.500 0.94
14 93.286 0.96
16 91.750 0.96
18 85.250 0.97
20 82.000 0.97
TABLE II: Performance table of the meta game and the shortest
edge attack averaged over 100 runs in a fully connected network.
Nodes Time performance,Time(WNE)/Time(LSEA)
Cost performance,
WNE/LSEA
4 127.286 0.86
6 148.333 0.85
8 143.750 0.85
10 151.500 0.85
12 268.857 0.84
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we consider the case of a typical path
planning problem defined over a road-map where the vehicle
searches to find an optimal path from a given source to a
destination in presence of an attacker who has the ability
to launch an attack over an edge of the road-map. The
defender (vehicle) can take an action to detect an attack at
the expense of some cost (energy), and disable the attack
permanently if detected repeatedly. We modeled this setup
using the framework of a zero-sum dynamic game with a
stopping state being played simultaneously by the attacker
and defender. We characterized the Nash equilibria of this
game and provided the closed form expressions for the case
where both the defender and attacker are limited to only two
actions. We further provided an analytic lower bound for
the dynamic zero-sum game and characterized the conditions
under which it grows sub-linearly with the number of stages.
The sensitivity of the dynamic zero-sum game was studied
with respect to (i) the cost of using the countermeasure,
(ii) the cost of motion and (iii) the benefit of disabling the
attack was. The results of this game was used to create a
zero-sum meta game over the road-map. The solution of the
defined meta game was compared against the result of a well-
known approach based on replacing the edge weights with
the expected cost of playing the game under a single edge
attack, and determining the shortest path.
Future directions include the extensions to multiple attacks
in the dynamic zero-sum game played over an edge. Non-
zero sum formulations modeling different objectives of the
attacker and the defender is also a promising direction. The
constraint of one edge attack over the graph could be relaxed
to have attacks over multiple edges. Formulations involving
multiple vehicles are also a topic of future investigation.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Since the game consists of only 2 players, the following
method can be used to determine the policy for each player
at any stage k. Equation (7) can be re-written as,
Vk−1 = y′k

[
a11 a12
a21 a22
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A(k)
 zk. (15)
Policy for Defender: The expected value of a game at any
stage k is given as,
Vk(A(k))
.
= min
y∈Y
max
z∈Z
y′Az,
= min
y∈{y1,y2}
max
z∈{z1,z2}
(
(y1a11 + y2a21)z1+
(y1a12 + y2a22)z2
)
,
(16)
where, Y and Z is probability simplex of dimension 2. From
[15] the mixed policy of a player is determined through a
graphical approach or analytically. Given the policy of other
player(s), the expected outcome over any action must be
the equal to each other. From the probability simplex of
dimension 2, we get y2 = 1−y1. This leads to the following,
Vk(A(k)) = min
y1∈[0,1]
max
[
y1a11 + (1− y1)a21
y1a12 + (1− y1)a22
]
. (17)
Equation (17) yields the policy for player 1 as,
y1a11 + a21 − a21y1 = y1a12 + a22 − a22y1,
⇒ y∗1 =
a22 − a21
(a11 − a21 − a12 + a21) .
1 2
3
4 5
6
7
8
9
10 0.4585
0.5415
D
ef
en
de
r p
ro
ba
bi
liti
es
Shortest path
(a)
1 2
3
4 5
6
7
8
9
10 0.2555
0.7445
At
ta
ck
er
 p
ro
ba
bi
liti
es
Shortest path
(b)
5 10 15 20
Nodes
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
(S
ho
rte
st 
Pa
th)
Meta Game
(c)
4 6 8 10 12
Nodes
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
(S
ho
rte
st 
Pa
th) Meta Game
(d)
Fig. 5: (a) A graph consisting of 10 nodes which is sparsely connected. The output of Algorithm 1 is path 1 − 5 − 10. Of all paths
available, the path 1− 7− 10 has highest likelihood of getting selected. (b) Edge 1− 5 has the least chance of being attacked, while edge
7 − 10 has the highest chance of getting attacked. (c) The probability of choosing the shortest path for graphs with an average vertex
degree in the interval [2, 3]. (d) Probability of choosing the shortest path in a fully connected network.
The probability of choosing the second action is given as,
y∗2 =
a11 − a12
(a11 − a21 − a12 + a22) .
Substituting the values from the matrix A, equation (8) yields
the optimal policy for defender.
Policy for Attacker: Similarly, the mixed policy for at-
tacker is determined as,
Vk(A(k)) = min max
z∈{z1}
(
a11z1 + a12(1− z1),
a21z1 + a22(1− z1)
)
. (18)
Equation (18) gives us the policy for attacker as,
z1a11 + a12 − a12z1 = z1a21 + a22 − a22z1,
z1 =
a22 − a12
(a11 − a21 − a12 + a22) .
The complimentary probability is given as,
z2 = 1− z1 = a11 − a21
(a11 − a21 − a12 + a22) .
This yields the mixed policy of the attacker in equation (9).
Value of the game: The value of the game at any stage
’k’ is given by,
Vk−1 = y′∗k A(k)z
∗
k,
Vk−1 =
det(A(k))
(s11 − s21 − s12 + s22 − Vk) .
Expanding the terms,
Vk−1 = Vk +
det(S)− s22Vk
(s11 − s21 − s12 + s22 − Vk) . (19)
B. Proof of Proposition 3.2
To determine the lower bound of the expected outcome
of the game at any stage k, we begin with the analysis of
the recursive equation (12). It is observed that the recursive
equation can be formulated by a continuous version using
Taylor series expansion about the point, k as follows,
V (k −∆k) = V (k)−∆kV ′(k),
⇒ V (k)− V (k −∆k)
∆k
= V ′(k),
⇒ lim
∆k→0
V (k)− V (k −∆k)
∆k
=
r2 − r1 − r2Vk
Vk − r2 + r1 .
We obtain the continuous form of equation (12) as,
dV
dk
=
r2 − r1 − r2Vk
Vk − r2 + r1 . (20)
If r2 = 0, integrating with respect to V and k,∫ VKe
V
Vk + r1 dV = −
∫ Ke
k
r1 ds,
V 2
2
+ r1V |VKeV = −r1(Ke − k),
V 2Ke
2
+ r1VKe −
V 2
2
− r1V = −r1(Ke − k).
(21)
The expected value of the game at the final stage Ke is
given as VKe , which has been normalized to 1. Substituting
the value in the equation (21),
1
2
+ r1 − V
2
2
− r1V = −r1(Ke − k). (22)
The solution of the equation (22) yields the desired result
given by,
Vk = −r1 +
√
r21 + (2r1Ke + 2r1(1− k) + 1).
Similarly, if r2 > 0, and let c = r2 − r1. Integrating the
expression (20) again with respect to V and k we obtain the
implicit form of the value function as,∫ VKe
V
Vk − c
c− r2Vk dV =
∫ Ke
k
ds,
(r2 − 1)c log(|r2V − c|)
r22
− V
r2
+K = (Ke − k),
(23)
where K is the integration constant given by
K := 1
r2
− (r2 − 1)(r2 − r1) log(r1)
r22
.
